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The quantum theory of measurement has been a matter of debate for over eighty
years. Most of the discussion has focused on theoretical issues with the consequence
that other aspects (such as the operational prescriptions that are an integral part of
experimental physics) have been largely ignored. This has undoubtedly exacerbated
attempts to find a solution to the “measurement problem”. How the measurement
problem is defined depends to some extent on how the theoretical concepts intro-
duced by the theory are interpreted. In this paper, we fully embrace the minimalist
statistical (ensemble) interpretation of quantum mechanics espoused by Einstein,
Ballentine, and others. According to this interpretation, the quantum state descrip-
tion applies only to a statistical ensemble of similarly prepared systems rather than
representing an individual system. Thus, the statistical interpretation obviates the
need to entertain reduction of the state vector, one of the primary dilemmas of the
measurement problem. The other major aspect of the measurement problem, the
necessity of describing measurements in terms of classical concepts that lay outside
of quantum theory, remains. A consistent formalism for interacting quantum and
classical systems, like the one based on ensembles on configuration space that we re-
fer to in this paper, might seem to eliminate this facet of the measurement problem;
however, we argue that the ultimate interface with experiments is described by oper-
ational prescriptions and not in terms of the concepts of classical theory. There is no
doubt that attempts to address the measurement problem have yielded important
advances in fundamental physics; however, it is also very clear that the measure-
2ment problem is still far from being resolved. The pedestrian approach presented
here suggests that this state of affairs is in part the result of searching for a theoret-
ical/mathematical solution to what is fundamentally an experimental/observational
question. It suggests also that the measurement problem is, in some sense, ill-posed
and might never be resolved. This point of view is tenable so long as one is willing to
view physical theories as providing models of nature rather than complete descrip-
tions of reality. Among other things, these considerations lead us to suggest that the
Copenhagen interpretation’s insistence on the classicality of the measurement appa-
ratus should be replaced by the requirement that a measurement, which is specified
operationally, should simply be of sufficient precision.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the beginning of quantum mechanics more than 80 years ago, physicists have argued
about how to interpret the theoretical concepts introduced by the theory. Perhaps the most
troublesome of all is the meaning of the wave function Ψ introduced by Schro¨dinger in 1926
[1]. Both the statistical rule, probability ∼ |Ψ|2, suggested by Born [2] and the concomitant
phenomenon of quantum interference were anathemas to classical physics. The founders
of quantum mechanics including Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli, Schro¨dinger, and Einstein spent
considerable effort worrying about how best to interpret the theory. In fact, there is more
than one “interpretation” of quantum mechanics and the precise meanings of these remain
the subject of much discussion. There has never been (nor, perhaps, ever will be) complete
agreement on this issue.
Bohr’s point of view, commonly referred to as the Copenhagen interpretation (see below),
was for many years considered to be the agreed upon viewpoint, at least as was declared in
standard textbooks on quantum mechanics. Modern texts and the teachers that use them
are often more circumspect and usually list a variety of interpretations such as the ensemble
interpretation, the Copenhagen interpretation, decoherence theory, realist models such as
Bohmian mechanics, the many worlds interpretation, etc. The truth of the matter is that
few physicists actually know the details of any of these interpretations. Even the principal
proponents of the Copenhagen interpretation, Bohr, Heisenberg, and Pauli disagreed on
various aspects of it. Most physicists seem to arrive at some vague personal interpretation
3of quantum mechanics and then stop worrying about it, following the David Mermin maxim
embodied in his statement, “If I were forced to sum up in one sentence what the Copenhagen
interpretation says to me, it would be ‘Shut up and calculate!’” [3]. That is, if one solves
Schro¨dinger’s equation (or a relativistic equivalent) and uses the statistical Born rule to
interpret the solution, then quantum theory seems to provide a complete description of all
that can be observed. Further discussion as to the physical significance of Ψ or as to whether
or not it provides a complete description of reality is unnecessary and should be eschewed.
As a case in point, consider the so called Copenhagen interpretation. While physicists
still argue about what is and what is not included in the Copenhagen interpretation, at the
very least most would agree that, according to this interpretation, the wave function, or
alternatively the density matrix, predicts the probability distribution of outcomes of par-
ticular measurements made on an ensemble of similarly prepared systems. However, as
to how to perform these measurements, both theory and the accompanying interpretation
are silent. Such predictions must be turned over to experimental physicists in whom both
classical physics and the art of constructing apparatus are deeply ingrained. (While not
usually acknowledged, the same is true in other domains of physics. That is, even after an
interpretation is given, there is no implied prescription for how to perform an experiment.)
Nevertheless, the Copenhagen interpretation often serves as a foil for discussions of inter-
pretations of quantum mechanics and the measurement problem and it is useful to make
explicit those aspects of it that are referred to in this paper, with the caveat that there is
no well defined Copenhagen interpretation. In Heisenberg’s words: “...it may be a point in
the Copenhagen interpretation that its language has a certain degree of vagueness, and I
doubt whether it can become clearer by trying to avoid this vagueness.” [4] As mentioned
above, the main proponents didn’t fully agree on what the Copenhagen interpretation en-
tails. So we use the term simply to label the following interpretative statements that are
often attributed to it and other interpretations, and to which many physicists ascribe.
According to Stapp [4], “The logical essence of the Copenhagen interpretation is summed
up in the following two assertions: 1) the quantum theoretical formalism is to be interpreted
pragmatically ; and 2) quantum theory provides for a complete scientific account of atomic
phenomena.” Several operational principles that are often associated with the Copenhagen
interpretation are: i) the square of the magnitude of the wave function, |Ψ|2, is associated
with the probability of the occurrence of an event (the Born rule); ii) it is not possible to
4determine, via measurement, all of the possible properties of a given system (the Heisenberg
uncertainty principle); iii) the only possible values of a given property that can result from
a measurement are the eigenvalues of the operator associated with that property; and iv)
measurements must be (or invariably are) made with apparatus that are described in terms
of classical physics. Item iii) invariably leads to wave function collapse (see below); however,
this is not problematic for the Copenhagen or ensemble interpretations for which the wave
function is considered to be a computation tool rather than an aspect of physical reality.
This list is by no means exhaustive but will suffice for the purposes of this paper.
Perhaps the single most perplexing aspect of interpreting quantum mechanics is what is
generally referred to as the measurement problem, i.e., the unresolved problem of how the
outcome of a particular measurement arises from a quantum theory that, at most, renders a
probabilistic distribution of all possible outcomes. We say “at most” because quantum the-
ory itself says nothing at all about the measurement process. The probabilistic significance
of the result of a quantum mechanical calculation arises from interpretive statements that
accompany quantum mechanics but such statements are not, in themselves, intrinsic to the
theory. For example, most interpretations maintain that the measurement of any observable
of a system can only be an eigenvalue of the Hermitian operator associated with that variable
and the probability of measuring a particular value is given by the absolute value squared of
the corresponding eigenfunction, |λi〉, projected onto the wave function, |Ψ〉, of the system,
i.e., |〈λi|Ψ〉|2, the Born rule. However, such an interpretation is not intrinsic to the math-
ematical structure of the theory. Furthermore, just what constitutes a measurement of an
observable is not well defined and, in fact, constitutes one of the aspects of the measurement
problem. We maintain that this is also the case for classical theory and contributes to a
“classical measurement problem” (see Section VI). There are other interpretations that offer
different explanations as to the significance of the wave function and they are all extrinsic
to the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics and are all vague about the details of
what constitutes a measurement. Different people have emphasized different aspects of the
measurement problem; however, the following four (related) issues are frequently raised:
1) Wave Function Collapse: Part of any standard interpretation of quantum mechanics
is that the only possible outcomes of the measurement of a particular property of a system
are eigenvalues of the quantum mechanical operator associated with that property. Even
though it is not part of the Copenhagen interpretation, many physicists harbor the belief that
5the wave function represents the real world and, furthermore, that it provides a complete
description of an individual system. If this were so, then after a measurement has been
made, it must be that the wave function of a system is transformed by the measurement
from the initial wave function to the eigenfunction associated with the measured value.
The problem is that such a transition is not part of the unitary evolution of the system as
described by quantum theory. If it were, then presumably quantum theory would predict
this transition and, hence, the exact outcome of the measurement, thereby contradicting the
statistical interpretation that lies at the heart of the theory. This aspect of the measurement
problem is confounded by the fact that wave function collapse, if assumed to be a physical
process, would not be expected to occur instantaneously and should therefore be accessible
to observation. Decoherence theory has been useful in understanding how the wave function
of a system evolves as it interacts with a measuring device and the environment if these
are also described quantum mechanically by a wave function. However, this evolution is
necessarily distinct from wave function collapse [5].
2) The Consistency of Quantum and Classical Reality : In some sense, this is the flip
side of the first issue. We perceive reality as a series of events involving the objects of
our perceptions. These occur sequentially and definitively. On the other hand, quantum
mechanics seems to say nothing what-so-ever about these events but only describes, exactly,
the evolution of interacting wave functions. An interpretation of the wave functions is
necessary to make the connection with events and, in the end, it is only a probabilistic
statement about the real world. In short, the formalism of quantum mechanics precludes
the occurrence of any specific event whereas, in our world, we know that specific outcomes
always occur.
3) Classicality of Experiments : According to Bohr’s statement of the Copenhagen inter-
pretation, while a (microscopic) system under investigation is described quantum mechani-
cally, the measurement apparatus that observes it must be (or, perhaps, always is) described
classically. How does one decide which aspects of a system are to be described classically
and which to be described quantum mechanically, i.e., what is the location of the quan-
tum/classical divide? Many, including Heisenberg, have pointed out that this divide does
not represent a discontinuity of physical systems but rather is simply a transition from one
formalism to another. Nevertheless, it has historically been considered to be an important
aspect of the measurement problem.
64) Interference Effects : One of the most amazing consequences of the quantum nature of
matter is quantum interference, a phenomenon in which a particle’s wave function exhibits
wave interference. For example, if a single particle wave function passes through a barrier
with two slits, the parts of the wave function emerging from the two slits interfere and there
will be periodic locations on a distant screen where there is (near) zero probability that the
particle will strike. If one of the slits is covered, the interference fringes disappear. One
wonders why, by closing off one possible path of the particle, the probability of it striking
the screen at a previously inaccessible region becomes nonzero? This sort of interference is
not the least bit surprising for inherently wave phenomena like sound or light; however, that
“particles” should behave this way runs counter to our intuition. Furthermore, if one simply
determines through which slit the particle passes without obstructing it, then quantum
interference between the two parts of the wave function disappears. The only way this can
be explained is that such a determination, in some sense, constitutes a measurement and
the wave function of the particle collapses.
One rather curious aspect of the measurement problem should be kept in mind. It
can certainly be argued that for the last 80 years, while many interesting resolutions of
the problem have been suggested, the problem of quantum measurements remains largely
unsolved. Yet, the advance of quantum mechanics and quantum field theory has been
enormous and seems not to have been impeded in the least by the lack of a satisfactory
resolution of the measurement problem nor even by the lack of an agreed upon interpretation
of the theory. How can this be? On the other hand, we will show that this situation is not
particularly remarkable in the context of the pedestrian approach presented here.
II. DECOHERENCE THEORY
Today, many physicists are of the mind that decoherence theory has largely resolved the
measurement problem. While certainly relevant to the measurement problem, it is a far
reach indeed to claim that decoherence theory has solved the problem. Decoherence theory
is relevant to those aspects of the measurement problem that deal with the classicality of
macroscopic measurement apparatus and it will be important to compare the perspective
of decoherence theory with that of the pedestrian approach put forward in this paper. The
details of decoherence theory would be much too large a diversion to undertake in this paper;
7however, there are many accessible treatments in the literature including the books by Joos
et al [6] and Schlosshauer [7].
Decoherence theory is neither new physics nor a new interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics; although, it is certainly relevant to questions of interpretation. In decoherence theory,
the measuring apparatus and the environment with which it inevitably interacts are both
treated as purely quantum mechanical systems. As a consequence of the interactions of the
quantum system of interest with the measuring apparatus and it with its immediate envi-
ronment, the three become entangled, i.e., strongly correlated with each other. All, or at
least most, of the environmental quantum degrees of freedom are not observable (certainly,
not observed) and, therefore, must be summed over to achieve a reduced state of the system
plus apparatus. The net effect of the enormous number of environmental degrees of free-
dom is that off-diagonal terms of the reduced density matrix rapidly vanish, i.e., coherence
between the different eigenstates of the system/apparatus is lost. Thus, decoherence theory
demonstrates why it is that quantum coherence is seldom, if ever, observed at the classical
(macroscopic) level, the fourth aspect of the measurement problem listed above [5].
Another aspect of the measurement problem that we have referred to is the Copenhagen
interpretation’s requirement of a classical measurement, raising the immediate question as
to what determines the divide between the quantum system and the classical measuring
apparatus. It was Heisenberg’s view [8] that the dividing line between quantum and classical
did not signify a discontinuity of the physical process but rather is defined by the nature
of the measurement, which to a certain extent is at the discretion of the observer. In
fact, its not that the measuring apparatus is “classical” but rather that classical physics
formalism is used to analyze its behavior. The problem is how to merge the formalisms of
quantum and classical physics so that the evolution of the systems can be followed through
the measurement process. The Copenhagen and orthodox von Neumann interpretations
lack a description of the interaction of systems across the quantum/classical divide and are,
therefore, of no help in this respect. Decoherence theory has, in a sense, resolved the dilemma
but only by treating the macroscopic measuring apparatus as a quantum mechanical system
that interacts with the original quantum system via a quantum mechanical Hamiltonian.
However, one is left with the problem of the interpretation of the measuring apparatus
wave function in terms of ordinary experience. One still must apply the Born rule of the
Copenhagen interpretation, which, in effect, assumes that only one of the outcomes actually
8occurs. In this sense, decoherence theory does not address the problem that quantum
mechanics alone is insufficient to explain why we do not experience mixed states in our
classical world [5].
Finally, while decoherence theory is relevant to the measurement process in general and
is a useful computational tool for characterizing many microscopic and mesoscopic sys-
tems of interest (e.g., in foundations of physics, quantum information, and quantum com-
puting), it is far from useful in designing most experiments. Experimentalists have quite
successfully created experiments with no consideration whatsoever of the form of the ap-
paratus/environment interaction Hamiltonian. Indeed, in many cases the experiment is
designed so that the coupling of the apparatus and measured system is strong enough to be
able to neglect the effects of the environment. This is highly desirable; in an ideal experi-
ment, the environment would play no role. Of course, one might say that experimentalists
have simply learned by trial and error how to design experiments, after which these skills
simply become part of one’s physical intuition, just as people (even professional cyclists)
learn how to ride bicycles without any knowledge of rotational dynamics or conservation of
angular momentum. These same comments also apply to the quantum/classical model of
interactions discussed in the Appendix.
III. SYSTEM PREPARATION AND MEASUREMENT EXECUTION
Perhaps because of the emphasis of the Copenhagen interpretation on measurements,
another aspect of the quantum/classical divide is frequently glossed over and that is system
preparation. Preparation and measurement are fundamentally different [9]. A measure-
ment yields a numerical datum. The repeatable preparation process generates a statistical
ensemble from which data are collected. But how is it that a complicated and entangled
arrangement of macroscopic classical equipment manages to create a well defined quantum
system that is to be the subject of a subsequent measurement? A quick check of the two
decoherence review articles by Zurek [10] and Schlosshauer [5] reveals no discussion of sys-
tem preparation whatsoever. To be fair, the authors do refer to measurements that leave a
system in a specific eigenstate, which can be viewed as preparing such a quantum system
for further observation. However, in general, system preparation need not involve a mea-
surement [9] and, indeed, experimentalists probably wouldn’t look at system preparation in
9this way.
Consider, for example, the prescriptions for preparing an electron beam for its subsequent
use in a double slit interference experiment. These might include boiling off electrons from
a hot filament, which is heated by current from a power supply, accelerating these electrons
through a known potential (generated from a high voltage generator), and then passing
them through a small aperture so as to approximate a point source. At large distances
from the aperture the electron beam is, to a good approximation, described as a plane
wave momentum eigenstate. Nowhere in this description were we required to discuss the
quantum nature of electrons. An apparently classical apparatus was used to generate a
coherent quantum plane wave. One might consider the electrons initially to be in a pure or
even mixed, state that, by the correspondence principle, only appears to be in a classical
state. Then system preparation is effected by a “measuring” apparatus (e.g., a magnetic
field) that is used to select those electrons that are in the desired quantum state. However,
this view seems to imply that an electron wave function possesses a reality prior to the
experiment and independent of the experimenter. If so, then one is led to the view that
wave functions are the real entities which inhabit the universe with all the concomitant
problems (e.g., wave function collapse) that this entails.
The Copenhagen interpretation does not provide a straightforward account of system
preparation. In fact, in neither the case of system preparation nor measurement, are there
precise rules for associating the experimental specifications with the wave functions describ-
ing the systems. In Stapp’s “practical account of quantum theory” [4], he emphasizes the
operational descriptions of both preparing and measuring devices. While certainly informed
by classical and quantum theory, the effective “rules” of system preparation are arrived at
by calibrating both the system preparation and measuring devices. The calibration pro-
cedure is facilitated by the leverage of many possible measurements of the different states
of systems. This leverage was illustrated by [4] with the following example. Consider the
matrix element between two different systems, A and B, with NA possible eigenstates for
the former and NB for the latter. Then there are NA +NB unknown functions, ΨA and ΨB
but NA ×NB experimentally determinable quantities, |〈A|B〉|2.
“Using this leverage, together with plausible assumptions about smoothness, it
is possible to build up a catalog of correspondences between what experimental
physicists do and see, and the wave functions of the prepared and measured
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systems. It is this body of accumulated empirical knowledge that bridges the
gap between the operational specifications A and B and their mathematical
images ΨA and ΨB.”
How scientists arrive at these operational prescriptions is an extremely interesting ques-
tion that involves theoretical models, physical intuition, historical precedent and, we sup-
pose, even sociology and psychology. Is such a topic ever the subject of study? One might
argue that every scientific book and paper ever written is, in part, an attempt to answer
this question.
After a system has been prepared, how does an experimentalist execute a measurement?
In general, the construction of a measurement apparatus and the subsequent measurement
are effected according to prescriptions that the experimenters have both created themselves
and acquired from others. While the designs of experiments might well rely on fundamental
quantum mechanical and classical calculations, they also rely on previous observations of
the behavior of systems that are then described phenomenologically, i.e., not derived from
fundamental theory, and in some cases on conventional wisdom even if that wisdom is not
completely understood. Even then, the ultimate realization of the experiment is generated
from a set of operational prescriptions and the skill of the experimentalist in realizing the
experiment. This is the art of experimentation. The behavior of all of the equipment
generated via these prescriptions can, in principle, be described by fundamental quantum
(or classical) theory; however, it is doubtful this has ever occurred when constructing, for
example, a soldering iron. Yet, even if a soldering iron were, somehow, the subject of
an experimental investigation to confirm a quantum mechanical prediction, the test would
presumably require yet another apparatus to perform the experiment. Our claim is that the
prescriptions that define an experiment are expressed neither in the language of quantum
theory nor in the language of classical theory but rather in the common (technical) language
that directs the actions of the experimenter.
We should emphasize that these operational prescriptions have little to do with the styl-
ized experiments and simplified procedures that one might find in articles on quantum
measurement theory. The latter are those that can, and invariably are, characterized by the
mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics. (There are good accounts in the literature
which emphasize these more formal aspects of system preparation [11, 12].) By operational
procedures, we are referring instead to the much more complicated prescriptions actually
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used by experimental physicists, engineers, and technicians when they carry out their work.
While the need for such prescriptions is sometimes addressed in the literature [4, 9, 13],
the prescriptions themselves have received surprisingly little attention and the important
role that they play is usually not acknowledged. The expression of operational prescriptions
is not theoretical in the sense that there is no well defined set of consistent mathematical
relations that define them. The fact that nearly all analyzes of the measurement problem
avoid discussions of this type of operational prescription has both been responsible for the
problem being posed in purely “theoretical” terms and has exacerbated attempts to find
a solution. This is not a criticism leveled at theoretical physicists. Experimentalists often
use similar simplifications in their research papers. They frequently give detailed recipes
to coworkers or share crucial prescriptive aspects of their work at meetings but, more often
than not, such details are not discussed in the literature.
The Copenhagen interpretation seems to tacitly acknowledge this issue by insisting on the
classicality of measurement apparatus, albeit with the “certain degree of vagueness” to which
Heisenberg referred [4]. One of the essential elements of the Copenhagen and von Neumann
interpretations is the existence of the quantum/classical divide, theHeisenberg cut if you will.
This postulate asserts that the quantum system is separated from the classical measuring
apparatus by the Heisenberg cut and somewhere on the far side of this cut there is a classical
apparatus and a classical description. In the Copenhagen/von Neumann interpretation, the
measurement problem is sidestepped by postulating a correspondence between the quantum
world and the classical description. However, this correspondence is not easy to characterize.
The Copenhagen interpretation lacks a theory that describes the interaction across the cut
and, in fact, presumes that what happens at the cut is not mathematically describable. Any
attempt to describe that interaction in a mathematically consistent way, inevitably leads
to a corresponding measurement theory for classical mechanics which picks up some of the
features of the quantum world. Again, the Heisenberg cut does not refer to a discontinuity of
the physical process but rather to a discontinuity in the formalism used to treat the system
and the measuring apparatus and the Copenhagen interpretation provides no theory of how
to bridge this divide.
In the Appendix, we describe an approach that provides a way to merge the formalisms
of quantum and classical theory; however, we maintain that this resolution does not solve
the measurement problem. There is, in fact, another divide and that is between quan-
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tum/classical formalism and the operational prescriptions of experiments. In some ways,
this divide is more insidious in that it is difficult to imagine a theory that would connect
the mathematical formalism of theoretical physics (classical or quantum) with the non-
mathematical prescriptions that define experiments. While the pedestrian approach of this
paper falls short of resolving the measurement problem (more on this later), it would not
make the theory any less testable nor any less useful than orthodox quantum theory, with
its Heisenberg cut.
An interesting question is why Bohr insisted that measurements always be described via
classical physics. Perhaps it is not because the measurement process is well described by
classical physical theory, but rather because of the happenstance that much of the same
language is used both for the descriptions of measurements and the formulation of classical
theory. This might lead one to the conclusion that all aspects of measurements are well
understood in terms of fundamental classical theory whereas, in fact, much of our under-
standing of measuring apparatus is phenomenological and is supplemented by precisely the
sort of operational prescriptions referred to above.
Before discussing further the role of operational prescriptions and their impact on the
measurement problem, we turn to some aspects of quantum and classical mechanics that
are particularly relevant to our paper.
IV. PROBABILITY AND QUANTUM MECHANICS
Max Born, in the 1926 paper in which he introduced the concept of the probability of
a state [14], gives the following description of the new physics: “The motion of particles
follows probability laws, the probability itself however propagates according to the law of
causality.” In this sentence, as Abraham Pais remarked, Born “expressed beautifully the
essence of wave mechanics” [15]. The probabilistic interpretation developed rapidly; the
early history of probability in quantum mechanics may be reconstructed from a footnote in
Heisenberg’s 1927 paper on the uncertainty relation [16] where he lists the main contributions
up to that date, starting with Einstein’s statistical interpretation of de Broglie waves in his
1925 paper on the quantum gas and continuing with papers of Born, Heisenberg, Jordan,
Pauli and Dirac. The literature on this topic is enormous and we will limit ourselves to some
historical considerations that are particularly relevant to this paper.
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The Born rule sets P = |Ψ|2. It is straightforward to reformulate quantum mechanics
so that the probability P plays a central role. As is well known, the polar decomposition
Ψ =
√
P eiS/~ maps the complex Schro¨dinger equation for Ψ to a pair of real, nonlinear
equations for two real variables P and S which now become the fundamental variables
of the theory. This transformation was first carried out by Madelung [17]. However, as
is clear from the title of his paper, his aim was to reformulate quantum mechanics as a
hydrodynamic theory and, in accordance with this, he interpreted P as a mass density
function, following the first interpretation proposed by Schro¨dinger rather than the new
statistical interpretation of Born (Madelung’s paper was published in 1927 but submitted
in October 1926, a few months after the papers in which Born introduced his new rule).
In this formulation, the function S plays the role of a potential for the velocity field v of
the fluid, which is defined according to v = ∇S/m. Making use of this interpretation of S,
Madelung shows that the real and imaginary parts of the Schro¨dinger equation correspond
to a hydrodynamical equation of continuity for the mass density function and to an equation
for irrotational fluid flow but with a (nonclassical) term which Madelung describes somewhat
vaguely as due to the action of “internal” forces of the continuum.
Madelung’s formulation was revived in the 1950’s by Takabayasi [18, 19] and, in modified
form, by Bohm and Vigier [20] and Scho¨nberg [21]. Takabayasi in particular developed and
expanded the theory considerably, presenting it as a new “hydrodynamical” quantization
procedure. He recognized that full equivalence with wave mechanics required a topological
condition which takes the place of single-valuedness of the wave function (i.e., that
∮
C
dS/h
must be an integer for all loops C in configuration space), introduced the concept of “quan-
tum stress,” and extended the theory to spin degrees of freedom, relativistic equations, and
fields. Bohm and Vigier further developed the hydrodynamical approach by adding fluctua-
tions to the Madelung fluid and modeling particles as highly localized inhomogeneities that
moved with the local fluid velocity. Their physical model, which was presented as an exten-
sion of the formulation of quantum mechanics developed by Bohm [22], was in part motivated
by criticisms (by Pauli [23] and Keller [24]) regarding the assumption that the probability
distribution of an ensemble of particles coincides with |Ψ|2. The work of Scho¨nberg, while
related to the physical picture of the hydrodynamic model, goes far beyond it by introducing
the second quantization of the Madelung fluid.
The authors who revisited Madelung’s approach in the 1950s considered the physical pic-
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ture of a fluid to be a useful model. At the same time, they were aware that it was necessary
to introduce substantial modifications or reformulations of the original Madelung interpre-
tation to bring it in line with Born’s statistical interpretation. That this was Scho¨nberg’s
motivation for introducing second quantization becomes clear from the following sentence
from the introduction of his paper: “It is well known that the Madelung model does not lead
to a satisfactory interpretation of the Schro¨dinger equation. By considering the Madelung
formalism as the classical theory of the motion of a fluid medium and applying to it the
second quantization we can get a satisfactory interpretation.”
It should also be mentioned that stochastic mechanics, which was introduced by Fe´nyes
[25] in the 1950s and later formulated in a different manner by Nelson [26], may also be seen
as a later extension of Madelung’s approach, in the sense that the stochastic process that
provides the basis of the theory leads to the Madelung equations. This has been emphasized
by Guerra, who writes in his review article [27] that “a natural and straightforward particle
interpretation of the Madelung fluid is indeed possible, but only by allowing a random
character to the underlaying trajectories. In the semiclassical limit h → 0 the randomness
disappears and the trajectories become those of the classical theory, while the Madelung
fluid, through the vanishing of the quantum potential, reduces to the Hamilton-Jacobi fluid.”
The most familiar formulation of quantum mechanics which makes use of P and S vari-
ables is the de Broglie-Bohm theory [22, 28–30]. It is, however, conceptually very different
from Madelung’s formulation and therefore it should not be considered an extension of it.
The approach is based on the co-existance of particles and a wavefunction that is assumed
to evolve according to the Schro¨dinger equation: instead of replacing the wavefunction by
variables P and S, the standard quantum mechanical description is completed by adding
point particles which follow definite trajectories which are determined by the wave func-
tion. The ontology therefore includes not only particles but also the wavefunction. The
field v = ∇S/m acquires a new interpretation, in that it describes the motion of individual
particles rather than the average motion of particles, as in the hydrodynamical approach.
One may adopt a “minimalist” approach and drop Madelung’s hydrodynamical picture
altogether (i.e., the assumption that P is associated with the mass density function of a
fluid) and interpret P instead in Bornian fashion as the probability density of particles. We
will follow this route here. This shift in interpretation leads to a formulation in which P
and S are still fundamental variables of the theory, but now quantum mechanics no longer
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appears in the guise of a hydrodynamic theory – it becomes a statistical theory of ensembles
on configuration space. We now give an overview of some of the general features of such
theories.
The description of physical systems by ensembles on configuration space (ECS) may be
introduced at a very fundamental level, without making reference to quantum mechanics.
The starting point is simply a probability density P (x) on the configuration space with
coordinates x, with P (x) ≥ 0 and ∫ dxP (x) = 1.
To set the probabilities in motion, assume that the dynamics of P are generated by an
action principle. This is a rather mild assumption which is valid for a very large class of
systems; in particular, it holds for the types of systems that we consider in this paper. We
develop the theory using a Hamiltonian formalism for fields (which, for our purposes, is
more convenient than using a Lagrangian formalism). Then, to get equations of motion for
P , introduce an auxiliary field S which is canonically conjugate to P and a corresponding
Poisson bracket for any two functionals F [P, S] and G[P, S],
{F,G} =
∫
dx
{
δF
δP
δG
δS
− δF
δS
δG
δP
}
. (1)
The equations of motion for P and S take the familiar form
P˙ =
{
P, H˜
}
=
δH˜
δS
, S˙ =
{
S, H˜
}
= −δH˜
δP
, (2)
where H˜[P, S] is the ensemble Hamiltonian that generates time translations.
The fundamental variables of our phase space are the probabilities P and the auxiliary
function S. One may introduce the notion of an observable on this phase space, as any
functional A[P, S] that satisfies certain requirements [31, 32]. For example, the infinitesimal
canonical transformation generated by any observable A must preserve the normalization of
P . This implies the condition A[P, S+ c] = A[P, S]; i.e., gauge invariance under S → S+ c.
Up to now, the discussion has been very general: since the ensemble Hamiltonian has
not been specified, the formalism may be applied to a large class of statistical theories. The
following ensemble Hamiltonians are of interest in that they lead to equations that describe
the evolution of quantum and classical non-relativistic systems [31]:
H˜C [P, S] =
∫
dxP
[ |∇S|2
2m
+ V (x)
]
, (3)
H˜Q[P, S] = H˜C [P, S] +
~
2
4
∫
dx P
|∇ logP |2
2m
. (4)
16
For example, the equations of motion derived from H˜Q[P, S] are given by
∂P
∂t
+∇.
(
P
∇S
m
)
= 0,
∂S
∂t
+
|∇S|2
2m
+ V +
~
2
2m
∇2P 1/2
P 1/2
= 0 (5)
while the equations of motion derived from H˜C [P, S] are the same as Eq. (5) but with
~ = 0. The first equation in Eq. (5) is a continuity equation, the second equation is the
classical Hamilton-Jacobi equation when ~ = 0 and a modified Hamilton-Jacobi equation
when ~ 6= 0. Defining Ψ := √P eiS/~, Eq. (5) takes the form
i~
∂Ψ
∂t
=
−~2
2m
∇2Ψ+ VΨ,
which is the usual form of the Schro¨dinger equation. Thus, in the ECS approach, classical
physics is not given a probabilistic description in a phase space with coordinates x and
momenta p using a phase space probability ρ(x, p). The two probabilistic descriptions are
not equivalent in that in general a ρ(x, p) has to be described by a mixture of configuration
space states P (x) and S(x) [33, 34].
Notice that quantum and classical particles are treated on an equal footing in this more
general framework, with differences being primarily due to the different forms of the respec-
tive ensemble Hamiltonians. One may ask whether the functions P and S can be interpreted
in a similar way regardless of whether we are discussing a classical or a quantum system.
We will show that this is indeed possible provided we do not try to assign properties to P
and S that go beyond what is required of a statistical theory; i.e., these are quantities that
should be used to describe the state of ensembles, to enable us to make predictions that can
be compared to experiments.
Before looking at the role of probability, we consider the interpretation of S, which was
introduced above as an auxiliary variable conjugate to P . One may define local energy
and momentum densities in terms of S. If H˜[λP, S] = λH˜[P, S], which holds true for
the ensemble Hamiltonians of Eq. (3), one can show that ∂S/∂t is a local energy density.
Furthermore,
∫
dxP∇S is the canonical infinitesimal generator of translations and therefore
P∇S can be considered a local momentum density. These results are generally valid [33]; i.e.
they hold true for both classical and quantum systems and thus provide a common physical
interpretation of S that is appropriate for a statistical theory.
To maintain full generality, S should not be regarded as a “momentum potential” for
individual particles. In particular, for an ensemble of classical particles it is not necessary
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to assume that the momentum of a member of the ensemble is a well-defined quantity pro-
portional to the gradient of S, as it is done in the usual deterministic interpretation of the
Hamilton–Jacobi equation. Such an assumption would go beyond the requirements of a
statistical theory and it is unnecessary. (This avoids forcing a similar deterministic inter-
pretation in the quantum case which would correspond to the de Broglie-Bohm formalism.
A deterministic picture can be recovered for classical ensembles precisely in those cases in
which trajectories are operationally defined [31].)
We have assumed that P is a probability density; i.e., that it is possible to measure the
state of the system and that P (x′)dV describes the probability of finding the system in the
particular configuration x′ within the configuration space volume dV .
It is important to point out that such an interpretation of P is generally valid (i.e.,
regardless of whether we are considering a classical or quantum system), despite the fact
that it has been claimed that probability theory does not apply to quantum mechanics.
Indeed, as B. O. Koopman pointed out in a seminal paper written in 1957, “Ever since the
advent of modern quantum mechanics in the late 1920’s, the idea has been prevalent that
the classical laws of probability cease, in some sense, to be valid in the new theory” [35].
In his paper, Koopman goes on to refute this claim. In the introduction, he writes:
“The primary object of this presentation is to show that the thesis in question
is entirely without validity and is the product of a confused view of the laws of
probability. The situation can be straightened out at a very elementary level:
all that is needed is to make quite clear that and explicit the concept of event.
It will not be necessary to either to adopt any particular position regarding the
controversial matters at the foundations of probability or to commit oneself at
all deeply on the level of physical law.”
Koopman’s main point is that the claim that probability theory ceases to be valid in quan-
tum mechanics is to a large extent the result of not distinguishing between compatible and
incompatible events, but once this distinction is made, it can be seen that the axioms of
probability theory are not violated in quantum mechanics. Events are interpreted in an
operational sense, as is clear from the following quote:
“A thorough examination of all the concrete applications of the theory of prob-
ability shows that the concept of event can always be interpreted as a statement
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concerning the state of a material system on a specified occasion. It is essen-
tial, furthermore, that the statement be meaningful according to the simplest
interpretation of Bridgman’s operational standards: in principle, capable of ver-
ification (true or false) by an observation.”
Koopman’s article, which focuses on the double-slit experiment, seems to have been mo-
tivated by a publication of Feynman [36]. The observations of Koopman do not seem to
be very well known; most textbooks of quantum mechanics do not incorporate them (two
notable exceptions are the textbooks of Ballentine [12] and Peres [13]).
An explicit proof that quantum mechanics satisfies the axioms of probability theory was
given later by Ballentine [37], who used the standard representation of observables in terms
of operators and verified, for both pure states and density matrices, that the axioms are
satisfied. More recently, a similar result was obtained by Goyal and Knuth, this time using
a different approach which allowed them to prove that Feynman’s rules are compatible with
probability theory by explicitly deriving Feynman’s rules on the assumption that probability
theory is generally valid [38].
The misconception that quantum mechanics and probability theory are incompatible is
unfortunately widespread. Ballentine reviews some erroneous applications of probability
to quantum mechanics which have resulted in claims of inconsistency between probability
theory and quantum theory. These typically involve mistakes where conditional probabilities
are handled incorrectly. Probabilistic formulas that involve joint probability distributions
also require some care because, as is well known, quantum mechanics lacks an expression for
the joint probability distribution of variables whose operators do not commute. A formula
that involves a joint probability distribution is no longer applicable if the joint probability
distribution is not defined.
It is important to stress that the arguments discussed here are independent of the choice
of interpretation of probability, as Koopman already pointed out in his paper, because they
are based on the axioms of probability theory and these are common to all interpretations.
Therefore, the P that is used in the description of statistical systems by means of ensembles
on configuration space plays the same operational role independent of whether the ensemble
describes a classical or a quantum system.
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V. A STATISTICAL DESCRIPTION OF CLASSICAL PHYSICS
One of the assertions of this paper is that classical physics is, in a very real sense, a
statistical model of nature. It is, therefore, not the statistical character of quantum me-
chanics that distinguishes it from classical physics but rather must be something else. The
ECS formalism presented in the previous section can be used to illustrate this and provides
as well a model for treating interacting quantum and classical systems (see the Appendix).
This might tempt one to offer the ECS theory as a resolution to the “classicality of experi-
ments” aspect of the measurement problem as well as providing a mathematical model for
the Heisenberg cut. However, we have already argued in Section III that experiments are
described neither by classical nor quantum physics but rather by operational prescriptions
that lie outside both the formalisms of classical and quantum theory. In fact, we will argue
in Section VI that, rather than resolving any aspect of the quantum measurement problem,
the statistical description of classical physics brings to light a concomitant measurement
problem in classical physics.
As we pointed out in the previous section, a statistical description of classical mechan-
ics may be formulated using ensembles on configuration space. For example, in the ECS
approach, the motion of a classical ensemble of particles under the influence of a potential
V (x) is described in terms of the ensemble Hamiltonian H˜C of Eq. (3) and the resulting
equations of motions are Eqs. (5) with ~ = 0,
∂P
∂t
= −∇.
(
P
∇S
m
)
,
∂S
∂t
= −|∇S|
2
2m
− V. (6)
In the limit of an initial δ function probability distribution, the equations reduce to the exact
classical equation of motion of a single particle subject to no uncertainty. Therefore, this
formalism includes both the equation of motion of an ensemble of particles and the exact
equation of motion of a single particle. In this sense, the above formulation might well be
considered to be more fundamental than the classical Newton’s equations of motion. The ob-
vious interpretation is that P (x, t) and [P (x, t)∇xS(x, t)] describe the statistical distribution
of the results of measurements performed on an ensemble of similarly prepared individual
particles, which is analogous to the ensemble interpretation of quantum mechanics.
At this point, it is important to stress that this statistical description of classical me-
chanics, while unfamiliar to many, is not particularly new or revolutionary. It is well known
that the Hamilton-Jacobi equation provides a formulation of classical mechanics that may
20
be considered as fundamental as the Hamiltonian and Lagrangian formulations. It is also
well known that given a solution S(x, t; c) of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation (where the c
are constants that specify the particular solution S), it is always possible to associate with
this solution a whole family of conserved densities which satisfy the continuity equation.
Hamilton-Jacobi theory is fundamentally a theory of ensembles [34, 39]. Any normaliz-
able density that satisfies the corresponding continuity equation may be used to describe a
physically allowed classical state.
How is it that the probability density P can be interpreted as a fundamental description
of a classical system? To be sure, all measurements of systems, whether classical or quan-
tum, are subject to uncertainty but, for classical systems, these uncertainties are usually
attributed to noise in the experiment. While, in principle, such uncertainties can be made
arbitrarily small, in practice this is not the case as is well known to experimentalists. Rarely
do the experimental uncertainties associated with a measurement apparatus even approach
the fundamental limitations imposed by quantum mechanics, e.g., δpδx ≥ ~. In reality,
the exact physical states in classical physics are just as inaccessible as they are in quan-
tum mechanics. Nevertheless, classical experimental uncertainties are routinely expressed
as “errors” associated with the result of a measurement and rarely, if ever, considered to
be attributes of the system under investigation and/or the measuring apparatus. But does
this have to be the case? If one considers the statistical formulation to be a legitimate de-
scription of classical physics, then it appears that the uncertainties associated with classical
systems should be as much a part of their theoretical descriptions as are the fundamental
uncertainties associated with quantum mechanics.
One might ask why the uncertainties in classical physics are largely attributed to the
preparation and measurement processes rather than to the theory. Perhaps, this happen-
stance is an historical accident. The uncertainties might just as well been attributed to
classical theory as discussed above. However, in most cases the relative uncertainties in
classical systems are so small that ignoring them or considering them to be uncertainties
related to making measurements is entirely understandable. If classical physics had been
generally concerned with very small (mesoscopic) systems or if our present environment had
been one that included a great deal of randomly fluctuating forces, then this might not have
been the case. Even so, there are cases in which uncertainties are considered to be part of
the theory. One of the earliest such classical theories is that of Brownian motion, but there
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are certainly other situations where this arises. For example, predictions of the large-scale
structure in the universe are invariably statistical in nature due to an inherent randomness
in the state of the early universe. The usual assertion is that the source of the randomness
is quantum fluctuations; however, this claim is more a matter of conjecture than deduction.
There are aspects of the exact state formalism of classical mechanics that are as trouble-
some as those of quantum mechanics. Among the primary theoretical constructs of classical
physics are point particles, particle trajectories, continuous media, and rigid bodies. While
these may be useful approximations to what we observe in the physical world, their primary
function in classical mechanics is as part of the formalism that is used to predict the statis-
tical outcomes of experiments/observations. Because the constructs of classical physics were
created from our everyday observations of the physical world, it is understandable that we
often identify them with reality whereas in actuality they are simply part of the theoretical
formalism that is necessary for a self-consistent classical mechanics.
As soon as one moves from formalism to the physical world, it becomes abundantly clear
the theoretical constructs are fundamental different from objects in the real world. For
example, the finite size, density, stiffness, and viscosity of real bodies are all determined
experimentally with no fundamental classical understanding of how they arise. These prop-
erties of matter are generally agreed to be quantum mechanical in origin even though most
are much too complex to be computed within quantum mechanics and so are still determined
experimentally [40]. In fact, many aspects of the consistency of classical physics collapse un-
der close scrutiny because of the underlying quantum nature of the phenomena. In any case,
there seems to be no compelling reason to cling to the precise, deterministic formulation of
classical mechanics in lieu of the statistical formulation that, in any case, formally includes
exact determinism by employing δ function probability densities as pointed out above.
Perhaps a more problematic aspect of the statistical formulation is the lack of a precise
method of specifying the initial configuration space probabilities of a system. On the other
hand, recall that neither is there a precise method for determining the quantum mechanical
state of a system without employing either the notion of preparation or measurement of a
system. As discussed above in Section III, quantum mechanical state preparation usually
proceeds via a set of operational prescriptions that have been complied through the pro-
cess of calibration. It seems reasonable that the same language could be used to assign a
statistical distribution to a classical state. Certainly, experimentalists spend a great deal,
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probably most, of their effort in understanding and estimating uncertainties associated with
the experimental setup. These efforts might just as well be described as determining the
probability density of various components of the system.
VI. THE MEASUREMENT PROBLEM IN CLASSICAL PHYSICS
A statistical formulation of classical physics brings with it a classical measurement prob-
lem. The probability function P (x, t) only specifies the statistical outcome of an ensemble
of similarly prepared states. There is nothing in the formalism to indicate that only one of
the possibilities actually occurs. Consider a position measurement: If one insists that the
probability function provides a description of an individual system, then the original proba-
bility density must be updated (i.e., must “collapse”) to one that has a lower uncertainty by
some process associated with the measurement (in general, the canonically conjugate func-
tion S(x, t) will also require updating). The description of this process must occur outside
the theoretical formalism of classical mechanics. Otherwise, as in the analogous quantum
case, the theory would predict the collapse and an exact prediction could be made, negating
the statistical nature of the theory. So it seems that a statistical classical theory shares this
feature of quantum theory. Because the contention is that physical theories, classical and
quantum, are statistical in nature, any implied “collapse” will necessitate a process that is
not included in the theory. It should be noted that, in the classical case, there is no inherent
linearity in the theory and so the violation of linearity by the collapse is not the culprit.
It should be pointed out that this argument is not predicated on the ECS formalism
introduced in Section IV which is only an example, albeit a compelling one, of how a
statistical classical theory might be formulated. The “collapse” problem would arise in any
statistical theory of classical physics.
Another aspect of the measurement problem that the statistical classical theory shares
with quantum mechanics is the Copenhagen interpretation’s requirement of the classicality
of experiments. At first glance, this may seem absurd; after all, how could classicality be
a problem for classical physics? However, what is meant by the term classicality is not
entirely clear. For example, the following is one of Bohr’s explanations of what he meant
by “classical concepts” (although it should be noted that Bohr addressed this topic in many
different ways, not all of which were completely consistent) [42]:
23
“The decisive point is to recognize that the description of the experimental
arrangement and the recordings of observations must be given in plain language,
suitably refined by the usual terminology. This is a simple logical demand, since
by the word ‘experiment’ we can only mean a procedure regarding which we are
able to communicate to others what we have done and what we have learnt.”
Stapp chooses to emphasize this pragmatic view of classicality by using the word specifica-
tions, i.e., [4]
“Specifications are what architects and builders, and mechanics and machinists,
use to communicate to one another conditions on the concrete social realities
or actualities that bind their lives together. It is hard to think of a theoretical
concept that could have a more objective meaning. Specifications are described
in technical jargon that is an extension of everyday language. This language may
incorporate concepts from classical physics. But this fact in no way implies that
these concepts are valid beyond the realm in which they are used by technicians.”
The point is that descriptions of experiments are invariably given in terms of operational
prescriptions or specifications that can be communicated to the technicians, engineers, and
the physics community at large. In some sense, even the words we use to write journal articles
to present the results of an experiment might be considered to be part of the measurement
apparatus. Are these operational prescriptions part and parcel of classical theory? Are they
couched in terms of point particles, rigid solid bodies, and Newton’s laws? Of course not.
They are part of Bohr’s “procedure regarding which we are able to communicate to others
what we have done and what we have learnt.”
So why is it that the word “classical” can be taken in so many ways by physicists? There
seems to be a tendency among physicists to think of every aspect of physics before quan-
tum mechanics to be part of the classical picture or, perhaps, every subject of any scientific
discipline that doesn’t employ a quantum mechanical analysis should be viewed as classical.
While in a certain sense this is true, such a point of view tends to conflate the theoretical
language of classical mechanics with ordinary (albeit technical) language, thereby removing
the division between the theory of classical physics and the description of physical measure-
ments. We have already pointed out that classical theory proper is quite formal and contains
theoretical constructs that are fundamentally different from objects in the real world. On the
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other hand, most of “classical physics” is phenomenological and makes no pretense to being
fundamental. Classical physics does not represent an all encompassing, although incorrect,
theory of the world. It is more patchwork of theoretical classical mechanics, electromag-
netism, and phenomenological truths combined with the conventional wisdom and standard
prescriptions of experimental physics.
So how do we treat measurements in classical physics? The same way as we do in
quantum mechanics, with operational prescriptions in plain language so that the results can
be communicated to the scientific community. These prescriptions are not contained within
classical theory. In this sense, the description of a measurement in classical physics must be
in terms of language that falls outside the theory. Of course, the measuring apparatus itself
can be described (statistically) in terms of the (sometimes phenomenological) concepts of
classical physics in the same way that it can be described quantum mechanically (although
it rarely is). But to the extent that the apparatus is treated as part of the classical (quantum
mechanical) system, it becomes part of the system under investigation and can no longer
be considered part of the measurement. Heisenberg expressed this in the extreme (quoted
in Ref. [8]): “One may treat the whole world as one mechanical system, but then only a
mathematical problem remains while access to observation is closed off.”
The bottom line is that classical physics is faced with the same two major aspects of the
measurement problem as quantum mechanics: 1) The theory is fundamentally statistical in
nature and any attempt to interpret it for single systems requires a “collapse” that neces-
sarily lies outside the theory; and 2) The descriptions (specifications) of experiments must
be operational prescriptions that are outside of theoretical physics, and the results must
be communicated in plain language rather than with theoretical concepts. Our pedestrian
approach to the former is simply that both quantum and classical physics are theories, not
of individual systems, but rather of the statistical behavior of ensembles of systems. The
quantum part of this statement is consistent with the minimalist interpretation of quantum
mechanics espoused by Einstein [43], Ballentine [44], and others. As for the latter aspect of
the measurement problem, our pedestrian approach is similar to Bohr’s and Heisenberg’s as
espoused in the Copenhagen interpretation: “the description of the experimental arrange-
ment and the recordings of observations must be given in plain language” and not in terms
of theoretical constructs. (However, it should be noted that Bohr used the terms ‘in plain
language’ and ‘classical physical concepts’ interchangeably.) Without these operational de-
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scriptions, both quantum mechanics and classical theory are mathematical formalisms that
necessarily remain detached from the real world.
The description of the classical measurement problem presented here leads necessarily
to a reevaluation of some of the issues raised in Section I regarding the quantum measure-
ment problem. Part of the classicality of experiments aspect of the quantum measurement
problem is the issue of where to place the quantum/classical divide. We pointed out above,
locating the divide goes only part way. One must also introduce a method to bridge the two
formalisms, quantum and classical, in order to describe the occurrence of a measurement.
Decoherence theory avoids this aspect of the measurement problem by treating the mea-
suring apparatus as another quantum mechanical system. However, in so doing, the actual
measurement is simply pushed out further until it can be described by operational prescrip-
tions that define it. The divide between the theoretical predictions and the measurement
remains unaccounted for. The ECS formalism (see the Appendix) is capable of dealing with
interactions between one system described by quantum formalism and another by classical
formalism; however, here again, the description of the operationally defined measurement
falls outside both quantum and classical theory. This topic is addressed in Section VII.
Another aspect of the measurement problem listed in the introduction, “the consistency
of quantum and classical reality” must be rephrased as “the consistency of quantum and
classical physics with reality.” That is, how do we reconcile the statistical nature of quantum
and classical physics with our observed perceptions of the world. Here again the minimalist
(ensemble) interpretation of our pedestrian approach obviates this problem by restricting
the predictions of both classical and quantum physics to the statistical outcomes of measure-
ments performed on ensembles of similarly prepared systems. The modesty of this restricted
interpretation of the domain of physical theory will certainly be distasteful to many physi-
cists. We will comment on this in Section VIII.
VII. OPERATIONAL PRESCRIPTIONS, CLASSICALITY, AND SUFFICIENT
PRECISION
If the above claim of the statistical nature of both quantum and classical physics is taken
seriously, then perhaps we are in need of a more general Copenhagen-type interpretation. A
possible version of such was alluded to in the previous section; however, questions remain.
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For example, what is it that defines the transition from the theoretical evolution of the
system to the measurement, which is defined operationally? For Bohr, Heisenberg, and
Pauli, the demarcation is simply when one stops talking about quantum mechanics and
starts talking about classical physics, with the acknowledgement that this transition is, to
a certain extent, at the discretion of the experimenter.
However, now quantum and classical interacting systems, taken together, are considered
to be part of the theoretical (statistical) evolution of the combined system. Then what
constitutes a measurement? A crucial aspect of a measurement is that it be the declaration
of a precise result [45], which can only be compared to the statistical predictions of the
theory. The ensemble interpretation characterizes these predictions as corresponding to the
distribution of measurements made on an ensemble of similarly prepared systems provided
multiple measurements are possible; when this can not be realized, it is still possible to
interpret the prediction in a Bayesian sense, i.e., where probability is defined using the
notion of degree of belief. How do we normally interpret experimental uncertainty? In
general, a one standard deviation (1σ) value, for example, reflects the belief that were one
to repeat the experiment many times, the results would be scattered about a mean value
with ∼ 68% of the results falling within 1σ of the mean. This is precisely the prediction
made by the statistical ensemble interpretation of a classical experiment. In some cases,
experiments are actually performed many times and the quoted uncertainties represent the
statistical distributions of the results. In this case, it is usually the standard deviation of the
mean that is quoted as the measurement uncertainty, which is interpreted as the spread in
the probability distribution of the mean of the results of multiple measurements if these were
to be repeated in an ensemble of multiple measurements. In the case that an experiment
cannot be repeated, e.g., the determination of the large-scale structure of the universe, then
one must interpret predictions as degree of belief.
In cases where uncertainty is established by multiple measurements, one might wonder
how it is that the statistical properties of the results of multiple measurements can be some-
how attributed to the statistical state of the system instead of interpreted as uncertainties
in the measurement. However, this situation can simply be regarded as a calibration that
enables the specification of the statistical state of the system. The same circumstances can
occur in a quantum mechanical system that is determined, after the fact, by multiple experi-
ments on similarly prepared systems. In other cases, when the predominant uncertainty can
27
be predicted or measured before hand, then one can simply assign a probability distribution
to the system. Of course, there may be many sources of uncertainty that require distinct
probability functions to be assigned to different parts of the system, which are then allowed
to interact with one another. Recall that components of the “measuring” apparatus are to
be considered as components of the whole system under investigation.
If the “measuring apparatus” is to be considered part of the combined quantum/classical
system, what is the actual measurement that is assumed to lie outside of the theoretical
description of the system, i.e., what marks the division between the theoretical description
of the system and the operational description of the measurement? The answer to this
question brings us to the notion of precision [45]. The contention is that the measurement
occurs at the point in the evolution of the system at which there is no further uncertainty
that may affect repeatability. Then the result is of sufficient precision that a measurement
has been made. This is an imprecisely defined transition in that the specification of sufficient
precision is left up to the experimenter. If the scientific question being addressed requires
more precision then a part of the sequence that was formally considered an operational
description of the measurement might, instead, have to be specified probabilistically and be
included in a theoretical treatment of the system. In some ways, this is analogous to the
imprecisely defined quantum/classical divide of the Copenhagen interpretation.
Once a precise measurement has been made, it has a permanence that can then be
communicated to others visually, in writing, verbally, in technical language, in English, in
Spanish, etc. Because measurements are considered to be exact and permanent, they become
a matter of record. However, even at this point one might wish to introduce uncertainty
into the process. What if one wishes to account for transcription errors, errors in graphical
illustration, errors in language translation, linguistic errors, interpretational errors, erratic
human behavior, etc.? In principle, these aspects of communication might also be treated
theoretically using information theory, with specific probability distributions determined by
calibration and then such communications could be considered to be part of the theoretical
evolution of the system. However, in this case, it is doubtful that one would characterize
this part of the system as belonging to classical theory. At some point one simply draws the
line after which errors are dismissed with the proverbial “mistakes were made.”
So far, we have discussed the evolution of a quantum measurement as the following
sequence: 1) follow an operational prescription to prepare the quantum mechanical state of
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the system and the classical state of the measuring apparatus; 2) determine the quantum
mechanical evolution of the system; 3) determine the joint quantum/classical evolution of
the system and measurement apparatus (if an ECS type formalism is available) or the joint
quantum evolution of the system and measuring apparatus (if a decoherence analysis is
performed); 4) determine the classical evolution of the apparatus; 5) follow operational
prescriptions to determine the precise result of the measurement; and 6) communicate the
result to others. Of course, measurements needn’t proceed in such a linear fashion. There can
be many quantum and classical components of the system and these can interact at different
times resulting in complicated mixed quantum/classical states. Or, it might be possible to
prepare a quantum state, let the state evolve, and then perform the “measurement” following
a set of operational prescriptions without any involvement of a truly classical system (as
decoherence theory would maintain); however, no specific examples of such experiments
come immediately to mind. With regard to 3) above, even in the absence of a consistent
model of quantum/classical interactions, it is undoubtedly the case that approximate (semi-
classical) models are available with sufficient accuracy to represent the evolution of the
systems.
One topic we have not touched upon is the relation of quantum mechanics and infor-
mation. As far back as Bohr and Heisenberg, there have been interpretations of quantum
mechanics that emphasized the relation of the quantum wave function to an experimenter’s
knowledge of or information about the real world as opposed to postulating that the wave
function is a representation of reality. The operational prescriptions discussed above should
then be described as prescriptions for increasing an observer’s knowledge about a given
system. The issue of how the operational prescriptions are related to an increase in our
knowledge is important, but it is outside of the scope of this paper. At a minimum, it would
require bringing in concepts from information theory (to quantify the amount of information
provided by an experiment which is carried out according to an operational prescription)
and probability theory (to quantify how the uncertainty is diminished by the data). These
fields provide tools that are extremely important for the description of the experimental is-
sues that play such a fundamental role in both classical and quantum measurement theory.
While some important aspects of the operational prescriptions will very likely remain recipes
that cannot be described in a mathematical way, efforts to provide a clearer description of
those aspects that can be formulated in the more formal language of information theory and
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probability theory are needed. However, we believe that such attempts at rigorous formula-
tions should not be carried out in such a way that the complex experimental issues encoded
in operational prescriptions are ignored.
VIII. DISCUSSION
As alluded to earlier, it is curious that the measurement problem has persisted over eight
decades even while advances in fundamental physics, quantum field theory in particular,
have been remarkable to say the least. Perhaps one reason for its persistence is because
physicists have sought theoretical solutions to what is essentially an experimental problem.
As a consequence, in debates about the measurement problem, the experimental side of
physics is largely ignored except in sweepingly general statements about experiments that,
if not inaccurate, are certainly of limited validity. Many quantum interpreters seem to
believe that fundamental physical theories should provide an accurate (or as an accurate
as is possible) representation of reality and that the theories themselves should provide the
basis for interpreting experiments. Many experimentalists would not necessarily subscribe
to this principle. In this respect, the following quote by Gutzwiller [46] seems particularly
relevant:
“The discussion of the so-called ‘thought experiments’ in most cases is singularly
crude, i.e., removed from any awareness of the practical considerations in a real
experiment. Time and effort is spent on purely mathematical relations. With
few exceptions, the hard work of writing down, and then solving the relevant
equations for a specific laboratory set-up has not even begun; in particular, the
inevitable presence of noise is ignored most of the time.”
In the early days of quantum mechanics, its domain was essentially limited to the micro-
scopic world, i.e., the world of atoms. The Copenhagen interpretation was often expressed
in statements like, “quantum mechanics is a theory that makes statistical predictions about
measurements made on microscopic systems with classical, macroscopic measuring appara-
tus.” It seems that Bohr, Heisenberg, and Pauli were comfortable with this situation and
were willing to limit the applicability of quantum mechanics to microscopic (atomic) sys-
tems. Nevertheless, there are significant reasons to consider quantum mechanics to be much
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more fundamental than classical physics. Today, most physicists view the quantum theory of
matter and radiation as a truly fundamental theory of nature. About this, there can be little
doubt. Because quantum coherence is critical to the measurement problem, physicists often
point to macroscopic coherent quantum behavior, e.g., superconductivity and superfluidity,
to demonstrate that quantum mechanics applies even to large scale structures. One needn’t,
however, appeal to such exotic phenomena. In a very real sense, the phase information
in electromagnetic waves is due to quantum coherence in a Bose condensation of photons.
Moreover, virtually every property of ordinary macroscopic matter can be understood only
in the context of quantum theory. On the other hand, in classical physics nearly every
property of matter is understood only phenomenologically. Indeed, the behavior of an ordi-
nary metal spring that obeys the “classical” Hooke’s law can also be taken as observational
evidence in support of quantum mechanics because without quantum mechanics the very
quality of the stiffness of the spring is an unexplained phenomenon. There are certainly less
fundamental quantum theories (e.g., the non-relativistic Schro¨dinger equation) that follow
from more fundamental theories (the relativistic Dirac equation); however, for example, the
classical Hooke’s law doesn’t follow from any classical theory. To be sure, both classical
electrodynamics and general relativity were considered to be classical fundamental theories;
however, the former of these is known to be only the classical limit of the more fundamental
quantum electrodynamics. The same is usually assumed to be true for general relativity
even though as yet there is no accepted quantum theory of gravity.
These arguments together with the great predictive successes of quantum mechanics and
quantum field theory (as embodied by the twelve decimal place agreement of the quantum
electrodynamical prediction with the measured g-2 value of the electron) have probably led
most physicists to accept that everything in nature is quantum mechanical in origin and
to infer that classical physics corresponds to an approximation to quantum theory that is
quite accurate in the limit of macroscopic systems with large energies. In fact, nothing
that has been discussed in the present paper would contradict this view. This isn’t to say
that classical theory isn’t enormously useful in our description of the world. In fact, the
majority of calculations in physics are surely classical computations. Furthermore, there is
little doubt that quantum mechanics would be absolutely useless in effecting solutions to
these problems; the complexity of most phenomena assures us of this. So how do we answer
the Einstein-type question about the nature of the real world? Does the fundamentalness of
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quantum mechanics trump the usefulness of classical physics or should we be content with
Bohr’s contention that both quantum (microscopic) and classical (macroscopic) accounts
must be employed?
At this point, it may be prudent to remind ourselves of what we often tell our students
and the public for that matter. That is, our theories should be considered to be simply
“models” that are useful devices in describing the real world. If one were to ask most
scientists whether a particular model coincided with the “real world,” the answer would
probably be “no, they are just models” [47]. It is the fact that physical theories (models)
are amenable to change in the face of new evidence that, in large part, is the strength of
the discipline. Granted, some models are extremely good. But as good as they are, they
are only models which we use to make sense out of the natural world and often have only a
limited domain. If this is the case, then why should we be upset by the incongruous union of
quantum theory and classical experimentation? Here again, the 12 decimal place agreement
between quantum electrodynamical theory and experiment leads many to take the position
that quantum theory, or some future version of it, is the embodiment of reality. However,
one should be wary of deeming a single (or even several) high precision measurement(s) as
strong evidence in support of a theory. [49] On the other hand, if one takes seriously the
view that quantum theory is simply a model of reality with a necessarily limited domain of
applicability, then perhaps the Copenhagen interpretation isn’t so distasteful.
Some might object to referring to quantum mechanics as “simply a model of reality” with
a “limited domain of applicability.” Because quantum mechanics deals with the fundamental
building block of nature, is it not surely the fundamental theory from which all others
follow? The problem is that other theories don’t necessarily follow from quantum mechanics
nor is quantum mechanics at all useful in dealing with most of the phenomena in nature.
Consider, for example, the problem of predicting the motion of an irregularly shaped solid
object tumbling in free space. A solution to this problem is relatively straightforward in
terms of classical mechanics; although, the addition of the elastic properties of the solid
would complicate the problem significantly. Of course, the elastic properties of the object
are phenomenological at the classical level and can only be derived from first principles
from the quantum mechanical behavior of the elementary particles that make up the solid.
On the other hand, solving for the motion of the solid from a field theoretic account of
the behavior of these particles is essentially impossible. In fact, its not even clear that
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quantum field theory is capable of formulating the problem. Instead, we invent a model
for the behavior of macroscopic solid objects, classical mechanics, which provides extremely
accurate predictions in such instances. If one moves from such a simple system, an irregular
solid body, to systems of extreme complication, e.g., human behavior, the connection to
quantum mechanics is even more remote. Finally, there is the fact that the predictions
made by quantum mechanics (or classical mechanics for that matter) require interpretative
statements and observational prescriptions that lie outside the theory.
One might argue, from a reductionist point of view, that surely the theory of the “small-
est” components of matter and energy, out of which everything in the physical world is
composed, occupies a privileged place in natural philosophy. The fundamental principles
inherent in physics in general and quantum mechanics in particular are surely to be thought
of as fundamental principles of nature. In a sense, this is true; however, in reality these
principles are the rules governing the models we construct and not of nature herself. For
example, Newtons universal law of gravitation, embodied by F = Gm1m2/r
2 and F = ma,
are rules that govern the behavior of the constructs of the theory, massive point particles
and the trajectories of those particles. There are no point particles and exact trajectories in
nature. These are theoretical constructs of a model that has proved to provide an extremely
useful description of some aspects of nature. The same is true for quantum mechanics, the
principles of which govern the deterministic behavior of wave functions (or Hilbert state
vectors), the theoretical constructs of the theory. This model has proved incredibly useful
in describing the behavior of matter and radiation (when combined with interpretive state-
ments and observational prescriptions), but the principles of quantum mechanics are not, in
themselves, laws of nature but rather the rules that govern the theoretical constructs of a
particular model of nature.
In fact, it is the mistaken identification of the theoretical constructs of a theory with
entities in the natural world that sets the stage for the measurement problem. Although we
have argued that classical mechanics has its own measurement problem, it is understandable
why this is usually overlooked. The constructs of classical mechanics, e.g., point particles,
solid bodies, and continuous media, all bear a strong resemblance with objects we see in
nature and so we tend to identify these constructs with the reality that they are intended only
to model. In quantum mechanics, following this practice of identifying theoretical constructs
with reality immediately leads to serious conceptual difficulties. To what objective reality
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does a wave function or Hilbert space vector correspond? If we identify wave functions
with objective reality we are inexorably led to the measurement problem. As to whether
or not quantum mechanics is the embodiment of reality, the above arguments suggest that
quantum mechanics is neither complete nor does it even provide an accurate description of
reality. It is, rather, an extremely powerful and useful model which helps us understand the
physical world around us.
One of the most pernicious aspects of the measurement problem is the imprecisely defined
quantum/classical divide. It is largely the inability of the Copenhagen and von Neumann
interpretations of quantum mechanics to model the quantum/classical interaction that ren-
ders them incapable of resolving the measurement problem. In our pedestrian approach, we
argue that it is not the quantum/classical divide that is problematic but rather the divide
between the quantum/classical analysis and the operational prescriptions that characterize
the measurement process. The fact that this latter divide is not mathematically describ-
able is not, we believe, a problem because the operational prescriptions themselves are not
theoretical constructs of physics but rather are given in Bohr’s ”...plain language...to com-
municate to others what we have done and what we have learnt.” We do not claim that
this distinction resolves the measurement problem but rather that it reveals that the mea-
surement problem is not a theoretical problem to be resolved. The realization is that all
physical theories, quantum and classical, derive their meaning by appealing to concepts that
must lie outside the theory. On the other hand, our pedestrian approach must still deal with
the interactions between the quantum system and the classical measuring apparatus that
take place prior to the measurement. The formalism discussed in the Appendix provides an
alternative, self-consistent way to treat the interaction of a quantum system with a classical
measuring apparatus. However, like decoherence theory, this formalism is much too difficult
to apply in all but the simplest cases. Therefore, one cannot claim that either of these two
formalisms could have provided much help for physicists in analyzing the results of a given
experiment. It seems reasonable that the liberal utilization of pragmatic, semi-classical, and
heuristic arguments in the context of understanding complex systems has served to finesse
such situations.
Because some physicists assert that decoherence theory has largely resolved the mea-
surement problem, it is important to point out the limitations of this claim. As discussed
above, decoherence theory does demonstrate why it is that macroscopic measuring appa-
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ratus, even if treated quantum mechanically, behave, statistically, according to notions of
classical physics. Whether one chooses to perceive this as verifying how classical physics
emerges from quantum mechanics or only that classical behavior is consistent with quantum
mechanics, the primary dilemma of the measurement problem remains. That is, how is it
that a continuous, evolving wave function leads to our immediate perception that specific
events occur in space and time. Finally, while decoherence theory can explain how the re-
duced (averaged over environmental degrees of freedom) density matrix implies the same
behavior as a proper mixed state, it is silent on the meaning and origin of proper mixed
states. Of course, this is a problem of quantum mechanics in general, that is, mixed states
are never the result of quantum evolution but rather must be posited initially using a com-
bination of quantum and classical arguments. In short, in the context of quantum theory,
where does ordinary experimental uncertainty arise? Finally, as we argued above, even if
these issues are dismissed, in the end we encounter operational prescriptions expressed in
plain language about which decoherence theory has nothing to say.
A primary message of the present paper is that classical physics is subject to the same
measurement dilemma as quantum mechanics. The resolution is, in short, that both quan-
tum mechanics and classical physics are probabilistic in nature and can only be interpreted
as providing statistical interpretations of the outcomes of measurements made on ensem-
bles of similarly prepared systems. In addition, the experiments themselves are ultimately
described operationally in plain language and the outcome of any given experiment is a
sufficiently precise result that can only be understood in the context of a predicted statis-
tical distribution. In this sense, our pedestrian approach is very similar to that provided
by the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. As to whether the evolution of
the systems is purely quantum mechanical, purely classical or a mixture of the two is, to a
degree, at the discretion of the observer. Where does this leave us with respect to the crit-
icism that a theory which only describes the statistical behavior of an ensemble of systems
cannot be considered a complete description of reality? One is left with two options: Either
the pedestrian approach has resolved or perhaps clarified the measurement problem or the
measurement problem is even more pervasive than before, encompassing classical as well as
quantum physics. We choose to embrace the former.
Suppose one were to accept the above pedestrian approach as a solution to the mea-
surement problem. This would certainly imply that quantum mechanics cannot provide
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a complete description of reality nor can a combination of quantum and classical physics.
Wouldn’t this constitute a crisis, the result of which might be a serious impediment for
theoretical physics? This is doubtful. As pointed out above, the quantum measurement
problem has been with us for the last 80 years and yet it seems not, in the least, to have
impeded the advance of quantum physics. Physical theories are models we construct to
comprehend nature. The fact that they are limited in their validity should not necessarily
be considered problematic. That some such theories rely on “classical physics” or the art of
experimentation should not be taken as detracting from their validity. On the other hand,
neither do we suggest that searching for new “resolutions” to the measurement problems
is necessarily a futile endeavor. Certainly past efforts have contributed to a deeper under-
standing of fundamental physics and we undoubtedly have not learned all there is to know
about quantum mechanics. Also, it’s conceivable that some future theory, some extension
of quantum mechanics, will be capable of explaining everything in terms of the fundamental
concepts of the theory; however, we doubt that this will ever happen.
Quantum electrodynamics (and its 12 decimal place accurate prediction of the g-2 factor
of the electron) is a fantastic confirmation of the success of a fundamental physical the-
ory regardless of whether this theory relies on other products of human imagination for its
confirmation. We admit that one of the incentives for our current views on the meaning
of quantum mechanics has been a desire to present gravity as a completely classical phe-
nomenon with no quantum aspects. However, even if superstring theory turns out to provide
a unified quantum view of all the four forces of nature, including gravity, it will not affect
the arguments given above. Such a unified theory of everything would, undoubtedly, still be
framed in terms of probabilities and would still depend on the operational description of ex-
periments to derive its meaning. Does this qualification make such a “theory of everything”
less prized? No. If such a theory is ever constructed it would still rank among the greatest
achievements of mankind.
We pointed out in the abstract that past attempts to resolve the measurement problem
have led to significant advances in our understanding of quantum mechanics with important
consequences in the mesoscopic domain. If the measurement problem were to be categorized
as a faux problem as this paper suggests, would that not have the effect of stifling inves-
tigations of the interactions of microscopic, mesoscopic, and macroscopic systems? This is
highly doubtful. The current advances in the understanding of such interactions and their
36
applications to quantum computing, molecular biology, nanophysics, etc., have been ex-
traordinary. These successes have spawned a vigorous, ongoing enterprise whose proponents
rarely, if ever, frame questions in terms of the measurement problem. In fact, reframing
the measurement problem as we have in this paper might well motivate new and fruitful
investigations of the foundations of quantum mechanics.
Physics is often said to be an experimental (and observational) science. The real world
confronts us every day with a plethora of phenomena and it is the job of science, physics in
particular, to construct models to help us to understand what we observe as well as to predict
the outcome of various situations. Because of the vast extent of nature, this understanding
quite naturally takes the form of a patchwork of complementary models [4]. The quest for a
single, all encompassing, consistent theory that provides a complete and accurate description
of the entirety of nature strikes us as the extreme of hubris. It’s not necessarily useful or
even desirable to view nature as evolving according to a single fundamental law. What we
can do is to construct improved models to make sense of the universe. That we have been
so successful in doing so is already nothing short of amazing, as is expressed in the well-
known declaration (often attributed to Einstein), “The most incomprehensible thing about
the world is that it is comprehensible.” This view of nature isn’t held by all scientists and
certainly not by all physicists. (We refer you to M. Tegmark’s notion that the real world is
precisely its mathematical structure [53].) The current patchwork of models leaves open the
possibility that future theories (models), quantum or classical, may be capable of describing
individual systems in the way that our current models do not. However, at this time it
seems that such theories are not required and that, at least until future experiments raise
new possibilities, the current (patchwork) structure still has a great deal to offer and that
many new and exciting phenomena and theories will be discovered within this context.
Appendix A: Coupling of classical and quantum systems
We have seen in Section IV that both quantum and classical mechanics may be described
using the same theory of ensembles on configuration space. The formalism allows for the
coupling of classical and quantum systems in a natural and self-consistent way [31–33].
For example, consider the interaction of a quantum particle with mass mq and configuration
space coordinates q and a classical particle of massmx and configuration space coordinates x.
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Further suppose that the interaction between the two particles is represented by a potential
V (q, x, t) that depends on both classical and quantum coordinates. Then the total ensemble
Hamiltonian for the system becomes
H˜QC[P, S] =
∫
dq dxP
[ |∇xS|2
2mx
+
|∇qS|2
2mq
+
~
2
4
|∇q logP |2
2mq
+ V
]
. (A1)
There have been many suggestions on how to couple quantum and classical systems as
well as many arguments as to why the coexistence of quantum and classical systems is
inconsistent, which are offered as “proofs” that the real world must be entirely quantum
mechanical in origin. Most of the latter arguments have been shown to be fallacious or to
lack generality while specific models of quantum/classical interactions, for the most part,
have serious shortcomings (see the discussions in [31] and [32] and references therein). The
ECS formalism overcomes these problems, e.g., it allows for back reaction on the classical
system, positivity of probability, conservation of both probability and energy, the correct
equations of motion in the classical limit, the correct equations of motion for both classical
and quantum systems in the limit of no interaction, automatic decoherence of quantum
ensembles, the uncertainty relations for conjugate quantum variables, and seems capable of
providing descriptions of physically interesting interactions [31–33]. In short, it provides a
consistent model for classical-quantum interactions.
In this paper we are interested in the ECS formalism to the extent that it provides a model
of measurement that may be used to describe in a consistent way the interaction between a
classical apparatus and a quantum system that is being measured. The equations of motion
that follow from the ensemble Hamiltonian H˜QC of Eq. (A1) are non-linear. However, if the
coupling between the classical apparatus and the quantum system is weak, which would be
the case for a measurement that does not disturb the quantum system too much, then the
departure from linearity will be minimal for the quantum system. Of course, non-linearity
would be expected for any formalism that deals with the measurement problem. After all,
wave function collapse is non-linear as, in some sense, is the Copenhagen interpretation
which imposes a statistical meaning for the wave function through the non-linear Born rule,
P ∼ |Ψ|2. Because of its inherent non-linearity, the ECS formalism can be extremely diffi-
cult to deal with computationally. Therefore, it seems highly unlikely that it will ever serve
as a general computational tool with which to solve general quantum mechanical measure-
ment problems. Nevertheless, it does provide an extremely useful analysis for foundational
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problems in physics. In addition, because it treats quantum and classical phenomena on
equal footings, it could provide a vehicle for classical models of fundamental physics forces,
for example gravity [54].
As a successful model of classical-quantum interactions, the ECS formalism does reduce
some of the vagueness of the Copenhagen interpretation and, therefore, offers some answers
to the measurement problem. There would no longer be any question as to the location of
the quantum-classical divide. It is located precisely when and where the classical-quantum
Hamiltonian specifies it to be [32]. Even so, Heisenberg’s view that the divide is, in some
sense, at the discretion of the experimenter is still tenable because of the inherent freedom
in constructing a sensible Hamiltonian relevant to a particular experimental setup. In other
words, different choices of classical-quantum coupling terms are possible. The Schro¨dinger
cat paradox doesn’t arise because the cat belongs to the classical side of the system and is not,
therefore, represented by a wave function. Interference and the superposition principle are
not part of the classical world. The classicality of experiments is no longer a problem because
there is now a completely classical configuration space in which the measuring apparatus
resides. In fact, it would seem that the ECS model provides a complete solution to the
measurement problem; however, the very probabilistic description that allows classical and
quantum mechanical systems to be treated side by side brings with it a classical measurement
problem, on which we elaborated in Section VI.
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